FSOC leaves mortgage markets unsure


The Monetary Stability Oversight Council’s latest feedback on the Federal Housing Finance Company’s proposed capital rule for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac bolstered facets of the proposed rule however left market contributors unsure about key points.

As an example, FSOC’s endorsement of FHFA’s use of bank-like regulatory capital definitions and construction means that this strategy will likely be retained within the remaining rule. FSOC additionally noticed that the capital “buffers” within the proposed risk-based framework ought to be risk-based, as they’re within the financial institution framework (a degree made by many market contributors).

Nonetheless, components of FSOC’s assertion increase questions for market contributors making an attempt to anticipate a post-conservatorship secondary mortgage market, ought to the incoming Biden administration’s FHFA undergo with the GSEs’ exit from governmental management. Three stand out.

First, market participants are concerned with FHFA’s and FSOC’s intentions with credit risk transfer (CRT), a essential housing finance reform made in conservatorship. By promoting credit score danger to traders, CRT diversifies the sources of personal capital and broadens the universe of traders that take up credit score losses. CRT traders monitor and assess mortgage credit score danger so the monetary system isn’t solely reliant upon the danger administration judgments of the GSEs. Additional, CRT permits pricing transparency beforehand absent within the GSE market.

CRT ought to scale back the GSEs’ required risk-based capital because the danger is transferred away, with CRT traders offering the capital backstopping the transferred credit score danger. But, FHFA’s proposal gives meager capital discount for CRT. If capital aid is proscribed, the general price of capital — fairness plus CRT — would improve, thereby eradicating the motivation for CRT.

Since FSOC’s responsibility is figuring out and decreasing systemic danger, FSOC ought to be a robust CRT proponent. Certainly, Treasury Secretary Mnuchin and Fed Chairman Jerome Powell repeatedly have supported CRT as an efficient means to switch danger from the GSEs.

Surprisingly, FSOC makes no point out of CRT in its formal assertion. Absolutely this panel of regulators understands that FHFA’s proposed rule would render CRT ineffective and that, with out CRT, the market would revert to the earlier focus of danger in and opacity of pricing by the GSEs.

FSOC doesn’t handle FHFA’s reservations with CRT, as expressed within the proposed rule, the place FHFA notes CRT’s limitations in comparison with frequent fairness. But, Fannie Mae’s and Freddie Mac’s failure in 2008 arose from their underpricing and under-estimating credit score danger, mixed with inadequate capital. They retained virtually all credit score danger on practically $5 trillion of mortgages. CRT, just like the reinsurance market, makes use of market mechanisms to distribute quite than warehouse credit score danger.

FHFA has the authority to right shortcomings it sees with CRT buildings used right now, if any. If it sees issues with CRT, it ought to make them clear and work with market contributors to search out options. FHFA’s and FSOC’s aim ought to be prudent ranges of each fairness capital and CRT. This might allow the Enterprises to learn from the distinctive loss absorbing and danger mitigating options of each whereas decreasing the associated fee and rising the effectivity of capital.

In sum, CRT can scale back each systemic danger and the quantity of frequent fairness to be raised whereas increasing the investor base targeted on mortgage credit score danger. It must also decrease the GSEs’ general price of capital, thereby reducing mortgage charges for homebuyers.

Second, FSOC’s statements on the leverage requirement despatched blended alerts. Per present financial institution capital coverage, FSOC poses that the leverage requirement ought to be a “credible backstop” to the risk-based necessities. But FSOC additionally famous that the ultimate leverage and risk-based necessities shouldn’t be “materially lower than these contemplated by the proposed rule.”

The battle arises as a result of leverage is the binding, not backstop, capital requirement in FHFA’s proposal. Such a consequence creates hostile incentives for risk-taking. Options may embrace aligning the leverage capital buffer — an add-on element of the requirement — extra with the financial institution framework or permitting CRT to rely towards the buffer.

Lastly, FSOC notes that the risk-based capital cost for mortgage credit score danger within the FHFA proposal is decrease than banks face, creating a bonus for the GSEs that “may preserve vital focus of danger with the enterprises.” This leads FSOC to “encourage FHFA and different regulatory companies to coordinate and take different acceptable motion …”

Ought to market contributors conclude that FHFA, throughout two very completely different administrators and after in depth modeling of mortgage credit score danger, is underestimating mortgage credit score danger? Or are the present financial institution risk-based capital necessities extreme? Does this portend a rise within the GSEs’ risk-based necessities relative to the proposal?

The Treasury’s 2019 report on housing finance reform burdened that “related credit score dangers typically ought to have related credit score danger capital fees throughout market contributors.” The Housing Coverage Council agrees, and financial institution regulators and the FHFA ought to search parity within the therapy of mortgage credit score danger.

Right here once more, FSOC’s assertion identifies a key uncertainty that must be resolved by FHFA and different FSOC members.

Edward DeMarco is president of the Housing Coverage Council and former Appearing Director of the Federal Housing Finance Company the place he initiated the Credit score Threat Switch program.